Title: Mechanism Design and Analysis Using Simulation-Based Game Models
Abstract:
I present a general framework for automated mechanism design on
constrained
design spaces when the outcomes of strategic interactions between the
mechanism designer and participants are specified using a
simulation. At
the core of the framework lies a black-box stochastic optimization
algorithm
which guides the selection process of candidate mechanisms. I
demonstrate
the efficacy of such an approach using a series of applications to
two-player design problems. A critical component of mechanism
design based
on simulations is an algorithm for approximately solving simulation-
based
games. I present several such algorithms, one of which is provably
convergent, and experimentally assess their relative merits.
Biography:
Yevgeniy Vorobeychik is a Ph.D. candidate at the University of Michigan AI
Laboratory. He has been a fellow in the STIET (Socio-Technical Infrastructure
for Electronic Transactions) program for two years and has received honorable
mention in the Computer Science & Engineer honors competition for his work on
simulation-based mechanism design. His research interests include electronic
commerce, game theory, mechanism design, multi-agent systems, and artificial
intelligence.